SFEcon’s rather innocent conviction that economic science should elucidate the processes of valuation necessitates certain theoretical exertions that do not generally occur in the social sciences. First and foremost, we must realize that a given commodity’s price has no meaning in isolation from the prices of other commodities. There being no such thing as a single price, any system of valuation will require that the prices of all commodities be expressed together. Thus ‘economics’ as we would have it must take in the production and distribution of all commodities; hence theorizing that we might call ‘economic’ is not complete until it arrives at an understanding of the macroeconomic whole.

Our presumption that macroeconomics requires description by its own causality, distinct from what is there to be inferred from materialistic interpretations on micro phenomena, finds considerable disfavor with social scientists. The social sciences have so habituated themselves to view familiar, local microeconomic activity as modeling the macroeconomic whole as to make counter-claims necessarily erroneous.

SFEcon’s further resolution to view materialism in the Western scientific tradition, i.e.: a Newtonian river of time flowing though a Cartesian structure of space, is also problematic from the standpoints one or the other repositories of economics’ established wisdom:

SFEcon asserts materialism’s decision space to be formed by the dimensions of all the world’s production and utility tradeoffs, and exhibiting a degree of curvature at every cell of a global input/output structure. Orthodoxy finds this representation to be necessarily incorrect owing to prior considerations rooted in one or more traditional forms of authority, viz.: religion, ethics, a fortiori reasoning, etc. Our inability to reckon this error is often received as no less than a confession of evil intent.

Where orthodoxy is incensed by our geometry, heterodoxy is at all points unhappy with our dynamics. Our finding that orthodox causality makes for perfectly satisfying science when rendered by the mundane practices of engineering dynamics can only mean that we lack an appreciation for the more strenuous dynamics required of economists.

Thus the orthodox economist, who would likely agree with SFEcon’s causality, cannot accept that his economic computation problem has any possibility of an algebraic solution; while the heterodox economist, who would likely credit our algebra, finds the computation problem so far removed from reality that no significance attaches to its solution.